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Abstract
Background: African swine fever (ASF), caused by African swine fever virus (ASFV), is a severe haemorrhagic disease
of pigs, outbreaks of which can have a devastating impact upon commercial and small-holder pig production. Pig
production in western Kenya is characterised by low-input, free-range systems practised by poor farmers keeping
between two and ten pigs. These farmers are particularly vulnerable to the catastrophic loss of livestock assets
experienced in an ASF outbreak. This study wished to expand our understanding of ASFV epidemiology during a
period when no outbreaks were reported.
Results: Two hundred and seventy six whole blood samples were analysed using two independent conventional
and real time PCR assays to detect ASFV. Despite no recorded outbreak of clinical ASF during this time, virus was
detected in 90/277 samples analysed by conventional PCR and 142/209 samples analysed by qPCR. Genotyping of
a sub-set of these samples indicated that the viruses associated with the positive samples were classified within
genotype IX and that these strains were therefore genetically similar to the virus associated with the 2006/2007 ASF
outbreaks in Kenya.
Conclusion: The detection of ASFV viral DNA in a relatively high number of pigs delivered for slaughter during a
period with no reported outbreaks provides support for two hypotheses, which are not mutually exclusive: (1) that
virus prevalence may be over-estimated by slaughter-slab sampling, relative to that prevailing in the wider pig
population; (2) that sub-clinical, chronically infected or recovered pigs may be responsible for persistence of the
virus in endemic areas.
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Background
African swine fever virus (ASFV) is a highly infectious virus
of the family Asfarviridae and is the causative agent of
African swine fever (ASF) infection which may lead to mor-
tality of up to 100 % in naïve domestic pig populations [1].
Per-acute and acute ASF present as high fever, anorexia,
depression, cutaneous hyperaemia (per-acute), erythema
and or areas of cutaneous cyanosis particularly of the abdo-
men, ears and distal extremities with sudden death within
1–7 days [2]. Low virulence strains of the virus have been
reported and there is evidence from Senegal, Cameroon,
Nigeria, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and
possibly Angola that pigs in endemic areas may have devel-
oped resistance or that chronic or sub-clinical infections
may be increasing [3–6].
ASFV has at least three distinct transmission cycles; (1)
involving an argasid soft tick (genus Ornithodoros) and
warthogs; (2) between argasid tick vector and domestic pigs
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and (3) direct pig to pig transmission without the tick vec-
tor. Direct pig to pig transmission is probably the major
mode of transmission across Africa in areas not adjacent to
national parks [7, 8]. The role of other wild suiforms (bush
pigs, wild boars and giant forest hogs) in the epidemiology
of ASFV is yet to be fully understood [8]. Pig to pig trans-
mission can occur both through contact between live pigs,
fomites or ingestion of infected pork meat [4].
Pig keeping in Kenya generally occurs as a small-holder
enterprise with between two and ten pigs per farm [9, 10].
The majority of pigs are kept under a free-range system
[11], especially in urban and peri-urban areas [12]. In
western Kenya where this study was conducted pigs kept
under a free-range system travel an average of 4 km very
12 h whilst scavenging for food within a mean home range
of 10,343 m2 (range 2937–32,759 m2) [13]. This scaven-
ging behaviour puts these pigs at risk of acquiring multiple
infectious organisms, including ASFV from the environ-
ment, neighbouring domestic pigs, or wildlife reservoirs.
There is currently no vaccine or chemotherapeutic avail-
able for ASFV and control therefore relies on preventing
contact of pigs with the virus. Free-range pig production
systems, as utilised in Kenya, require considerable im-
provements to biosecurity in order to prevent pigs coming
into contact with potentially infected animals or animal
products [4].
Several outbreaks of ASF have been reported in western
Kenya. Prior to the instigation of this study there were
two outbreaks between October 2006 and February 2007
resulting in 82 porcine deaths from Busia (formerly West-
ern Province) and Kisumu (formerly Nyanza Province)
[14], and after the completion of the present study, be-
tween December 2010 and March 2012, 163 porcine
deaths were reported in Mahiakolo (formerly Western
Province) and Kisumu East (formerly Nyanza Province)
[15]. Outbreaks of diseases causing high mortality, such as
ASF, are of high concern to poor farmers such as those in
western Kenya, with the potential to catastrophically
threaten their livelihoods through the rapid loss of their
livestock assets [16].
Exactly how the virus persists within endemic pig pop-
ulations is not known but a role has been proposed for
survivor, sub-clinical and chronically infected pigs to
maintain virus [17]. There is evidence that recovered an-
imals can transmit the virus to naïve populations for up
to 3 months [18] and may be persistently infected with
virus for up to 6 months [18, 19]. Low virulence strains
of ASFV have been reported in the Dominican Republic,
Spain and Portugal, which appear to lead to chronic in-
fections with prolonged viremia lasting several weeks to
several months [20]. These chronic infections, however,
have never been reported in the African continent [2].
Viral DNA has been detected in asymptomatic pigs in
both south-western Kenya [21], Uganda [22] and Tanzania
[23]. Genotyping suggests that the isolates associated with
this situation in Kenya are likely of low virulence (Geno-
type X) and of high virulence in Tanzania (Genotype II-
Georgia 2007). In Mozambique, populations of pigs have
been identified with high levels of circulating antibodies,
suggesting resistance to virulent isolates [6]. Reasons for
the apparent resistance of some pigs to potentially virulent
isolates of ASFV have been suggested but are as yet un-
proven. Breed resistance has been proposed [23] but herit-
ability did not appear to be the case in Mozambique with
all offspring of apparently resistant pigs succumbing to
challenge by isolates of the same genotype [6].
As western Kenya is an area where ASF is a regular
occurrence, an ongoing programme of porcine sampling
presented and opportunity to further investigate the epi-
demiology of ASFV during a period when no outbreaks
were reported. This study therefore aimed to investigate
the presence of ASFV viral DNA in domestic pigs pre-
sented to slaughter during a time period with no offi-
cially reported outbreaks of ASF and, should any virus
be found, to determine which genotype was represented.
Method
Study site
This study represents a sub-study of the “People, Animals
& their Zoonoses” (PAZ) project in western Kenya [24].
The study site is a 45 km radius semi-circle from Busia
Town and is largely representative of the Lake Victoria
Crescent ecosystem. It is bounded to the west by the
border with Uganda, to the south by Lake Victoria and to
the North by Mount Elgon. The ten divisions (the 3rd lar-
gest administrative unit prior to the 2013 constitution re-
form) with the highest pig-population and at least one
registered porcine slaughter facility (slab) were purposively
selected from within the study site; each selected division
contained over 2 % of the total pig population of the study
area. Figure 1 illustrates the larger ‘PAZ’ study area, the
pig population density (according to the District Livestock
and Production Office 2009 figures) and the location of
registered slabs.
Sample collection
Sample collection took place at slabs in the selected divi-
sions, which were registered at the time of sampling with
the District Veterinary Office. The pathogen of primary
focus for this sampling was Taenia solium as previously
described [25] and the sample size (319) was calculated
accordingly, using WinEpiscope 2.0 [26] with an as-
sumed T. solium prevalence of 14 % [12] with 5 % preci-
sion and 99 % confidence level. Our interest in ASFV
was solidified after the sampling frame was devised at
which point a collaboration was brokered which enabled
testing of these samples, this unfortunately resulted in a
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lack of appropriate samples being obtained from the first
66 pigs sampled.
Twenty-six registered slabs were identified and were
visited on the day of highest through-put, as identified
by the meat inspector or slab owner, and all pigs being
slaughtered on the day of visit were sampled. In these
low-throughput slaughter slabs producing pork for local
consumption, categorised as ‘C’ by the Kenya Meat Con-
trol Act generally 1–4 pigs are slaughtered per day, with
a legal maximum of 6 pigs slaughtered on any one day
[27]. Facilities were re-visited until a quota proportional
to the percentage of the total pig population in that div-
ision had been fulfilled as indicated in Table 1.
All sample collection was undertaken by a small re-
search team of one veterinarian (the lead author) and
two animal health assistants according to protocols de-
vised by the lead author. All members of the team were
present for every sampling event except in the occasion
of illness or unavoidable travel.
The permission of the person presenting the pig for
slaughter was sought prior to sampling and the division
of origin of the pig was recorded. Pigs were restrained
with a pig snare behind the canine teeth, a brief visual
exam was conducted and anterior vena cava blood sam-
ples were collected in BD Vacutainer® 4 ml EDTA tubes
[28]. Blood samples were transported to the laboratory,
on ice, where they were stored at −40 °C until trans-
ported, on dry ice, to the International Livestock Re-
search Institute (ILRI) facility in Nairobi where they
were stored at −80 °C for 2 to 7 months prior to ana-
lysis. After each slab visit the government meat inspector
was called and asked if any carcass or part thereof was
condemned that day for any reason.
African swine fever virus detection by conventional and
real time PCR
Total DNA was extracted from each blood sample using
the DNeasy Blood and Tissue kit (Qiagen, Hilden,
Germany) according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
Negative extraction controls (NEC) consisting of sterile
phosphate buffered saline (PBS) pH 7.0 were included
during DNA extraction to check for contamination.
Fig. 1 Map depicting study site showing divisional pig population density and location of registered porcine slaughter facilities at time of
sampling. This map was produced using ArcMapTM version 9.1 with geographical data provided by ILRI GIS unit http://www.ilri.org/gis and pig
population data provided by the District Livestock and Production Office 2009 figures and overlaid with the location of slaughter facilities
collected in the field using a hand held Garmin® eTrex GPS unit
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Conventional PCR was performed using the ASFV diag-
nostic primers PPA1 and PPA2 that target the highly
conserved VP72 capsid protein coding region of the
ASFV genome [29]. No template controls (NTC) were
included during PCR. Positive extraction and amplifica-
tion controls (PEC & PAC) consisted of a known ASFV
positive DNA sample extracted from an ASFV positive
spleen tissue. Positive samples were identified by the
presence of a discrete band of 257 base pairs (bp) after
electrophoresis through a 2 % agarose gel.
DNA samples were further tested at the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Foreign Animal Dis-
ease Diagnostic Laboratory in Plum Island NY using a
modification of the ASFV real-time PCR (qPCR) which
has a diagnostic specificity of 100 % and was therefore
selected as an ideal confirmatory tool [30]. Briefly, 2.5 μl
DNA was amplified in 25 μl reactions containing 0.3 μM
forward and reverse ASFV primers, and 0.2 μM ASFV
TaqMan®FAMTM-MGB probe using firstly the TaqMan®
EZ-RT-PCR Kit (Applied Biosystems Foster City, CA,
USA), and later repeated using the Life Technologies
Path-ID Multiplex One Step PCR Kit (Thermo Fisher
Scientific, Waltham, Massachusetts, USA) as the TaqMa-
n®EZ reagents were discontinued by the manufacturer.
Controls included an NEC consisting of 2.5 μl nuclease-
free water, PEC and PAC consisting of 2.5 μl of DNeasy
extracted DNA from the ASFV Killean III strain culti-
vated in primary porcine macrophages. qPCR was con-
ducted using the Applied Biosystems 7500 fast platform
(Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, Massachusetts,
USA) in standard mode with automatic baseline. Cycling
conditions were 95 °C for 10 min denaturation and
activation followed by 45 cycles of 95 °C for 10 s and
60 °C for 30 s. Positive reactions were identified when
fluorescence exceeded 0.2 units prior to or at a cycle
threshold (Ct) of 40. Results beyond the qPCR cut-off Ct
of 40 or undetermined were considered negative or
undetermined, respectively. Results with Ct < 30 were
considered as strong positives by qPCR.
In order to avoid potential cross-contamination, DNA
extraction was conducted in batches of 20 including ex-
traction controls and deep cleaning of the hood and pi-
pettes were done using 10 % hypochlorite and 70 %
ethanol between the batches. All PCR reagents were ma-
nipulated separately and ahead of sample handling. PEC
and PAC, derived from known ASFV positive material
and assayed along with test samples, were manipulated
only after test samples were processed and manipulated
for PCR. All negative and positive PCR and qPCR con-
trols performed as expected.
Genotyping
To identify the ASFV genotype(s) in the positive sam-
ples; genotypic analysis of 20 randomly selected positive
samples was carried out by analysis of two polymorphic
loci. This included:
I. The 3′-variable end of the B646L gene that
encodes the major capsid protein p72 by utilization
of the p72U/p72D primer set in the amplification of
a 478 bp region [31].
II. The E183L gene that encodes the p54 ASFV protein
critical in the recruitment of envelope precursors to
the assembly site [32] by amplification of a 676 bp
region using the PPA89/PPA722 primer set [33].
The discrete bands were directly cut and purified from
the agarose gels using the gel purification kit (Qiagen,
Hilden, Germany) according to the manufacturer’s in-
structions. Sequencing was then carried out using the
Sanger sequencing method. Conflicts within the sequence
reads were identified using BIOEDIT [34] and contigs
were built using CAP3 [35] available in the Mobyle portal
(http://mobyle.pasteur.fr/cgi-bin/portal.py#forms::cap3).
Table 1 Divisional pig population, sampling quota and number of registered porcine slaughter facilities at the time of sampling
Division Pig population % of total study
site pig population
Quota of pigs
to sample
No. of pigs sampled No. of registered slabs
Amagoro 1418 3.2 10 10 3
Amakura 3800 8.5 27 21 5
Budalangi 2640 5.9 19 19 4
Butula 1010 2.3 7 13 2
Chakol 1950 4.4 14 14 2
Funyula 8910 19.9 63 53 1
Matayos 5700 12.7 41 20 2
Nambale 14680 32.8 105 103 3
Ugunja 912 2.0 6 7 2
Ukwala 3700 8.3 27 17 3
Total 44720 100 319 277 27
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Reference sequences corresponding to the two loci were
retrieved from Genbank (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
genbank/) for comparison to the data obtained from
Sanger sequencing. Multiple sequence alignments for each
locus with reference to the Genbank sequences were per-
formed using MEGA version 6.06 [36] CLUSTAL W [37]
to determine the ASFV genotype(s) associated with the
positive samples. The alignment data was transferred onto
CLC genomics workbench for visualization of insertion or
deletion of bases (INDELS) and measurement of conser-
vation (http://www.clcbio.com/products/clc-genomics-
workbench/). Phylogenetic analysis of each locus was exe-
cuted using MEGA version 6.06 [36] and the evolutionary
history was inferred using the Minimum Evolution (ME)
method [38] after application of the Neighbor-joining al-
gorithm in generation of the initial tree. The evolutionary
distances were computed using the p-distance method
and the ME trees were searched using the Close-
Neighbor-Interchange (CNI) algorithm at a search level of
1. Data from both loci were resampled 1000 times using
the bootstrap method [39].
Statistical analysis
As the study described here comprised ‘convenience’
sampling, with a sample size and strategy based upon an
unrelated pathogen, we did not feel it was appropriate to
state the prevalence within this population.
Results
Three hundred and forty three pigs were sampled in
this survey. All animals appeared to be asymptomatic
for ASF on visual examination by the animal health
assistants and veterinarian conducting the sampling
procedure and government meat inspectors reported
no sick animals. Whole blood samples were available
for DNA extraction and conventional PCR from 277
pigs, of which 90 samples were positive for ASFV. A
subset (207) of the 277 samples were independently
tested using a modified real time PCR at the USDA.
In total 152 of 207 samples tested positive by qPCR
using the Path-ID reagents, of which 23 samples rep-
resented strong positives (ct values <30) (The results
of the conventional and qPCR analysis are shown in
Table 2 and Additional file 1).
Twenty of the positive samples had their genotype
sequences determined. Analysis of the B646L gene,
revealed that genotype IX was associated with the
positive samples. No INDELS were observed in these
two polymorphic loci, and the viruses were similar at
both loci to virus associated with the 2006 and 2007
ASF outbreaks in Kenya [33]. The phylogenetic tree is
illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3 and the Genbank accession
numbers for the twenty isolates can be found in
Additional file 2.
Discussion
This study has provided evidence for the presence of
ASFV DNA in the blood of visually asymptomatic pigs
presenting to slaughter within a period when there were
no reported outbreaks in western Kenya. Accurate deter-
mination of prevalence in this population is limited
mainly by the convenience nature of the sampling (the
study design relating to a different pathogen) and the
fact that only a sub-set of samples were analysed by both
PCR methods. The high number of PCR positive pigs
found in this study is interesting, because extensive hori-
zontal household sampling of asymptomatic pigs on
farms in the area of the current study between 2011 and
13 (>1000 animals in 600 households; R. Bishop, E.
Okoth and C. Onzere, unpublished data), did not reveal
PCR positive pigs.
Diagnostic specificity of the USDA ASFV qPCR, using
TaqMan EZ reagents, was previously determined within
the US National Animal Health Laboratory Network on
US populations of domestic and feral swine (Unpublished
results). Positive controls performed as expected and no
false positives were observed among a negative cohort of
EDTA blood samples tested from 895 domestic and 217
feral swine. Diagnostic specificity of the USDA ASFV
qPCR was observed to be 100 % using a 95 % confidence
interval with lower bound limits of 0.99 and 0.98 for do-
mestic and feral swine, respectively.
ASFV viral DNA has been demonstrated by PCR pre-
viously in asymptomatic pigs at slaughter elsewhere in
Kenya [40] and neighbouring Uganda [22] as well as in
pigs at small holder farms in South-West Kenya [21].
This is not, a consistent finding, with another Ugandan
study detecting no viral DNA despite high apparent dis-
ease incidence [41].
Genotyping of a sub-set of samples from this study re-
vealed the virus to belong to genotype IX. This genotype
Table 2 Detection of African swine fever virus in pigs at
slaughter in western Kenya detected by conventional and qPCR
Division of
slaughter
No. pigs positive by
conventional PCR
No. pigs positive by
qPCR (Path-ID)
Amagoro 7/10 6/7
Amakura 5/21 9/17
Budalangi 4/19 11/17
Butula 2/13 2/6
Chakol 7/14 7/9
Funyula 22/53 31/40
Matayos 4/20 13/14
Nambale 30/103 64/84
Ugunja 3/7 1/4
Ukwala 6/17 8/9
Total 90/277 152/207
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appears to have been involved in all outbreaks in Uganda
since 1995 and Kenya since 2006, including Ugandan
outbreaks in 1995, 2003 [42], 2007 [43], 21 outbreaks
between 2011 and February 2013, as well as Kenyan out-
breaks in 2006 and 2007 [33]. This genotype was origin-
ally thought to be specific to domestic pigs with no
evidence of involvement of a sylvatic cycle [42]. It has
since been identified in Kenyan warthogs; although, the
role of the warthog in recent transmission of the virus to
domestic pigs remains unclear [40].
Five months after sampling was completed (January
2011), two outbreaks were reported in western Kenya
(Mahiakolo) and neighbouring Nyanza province (Kisumu
East) where 163 pigs died, an apparent case fatality rate of
82.5 % according to information submitted to the World
Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) [15].
Fig. 2 Phylogenetic tree based on the 3‘-variable end of the B646L
gene. Indicates the 20 nucleotide sequences analyzed in this
study in comparison to 35 reference sequences obtained from
Genbank. The 20 sequences clustered within ASFV genotype IX. The
evolutionary history was inferred using the Minimum Evolution (ME)
method after initial application of the Neighbor-joining algorithm. The
percentage of replicate trees in which the associated taxa clustered
together in the bootstrap test (1000 replicates) are shown next to the
branches. The tree was drawn to scale, with branch lengths in the
same units as those of the evolutionary distances used to infer the
phylogenetic tree. The p-distance method was used to compute
evolutionary distances and the Close-Neighbor-Interchange (CNI)
algorithm at a search level of 1 was used to determine the strength
of the ME tree
Fig. 3 Phylogenetic tree based on the full length E183L gene.
Indicates the 20 sequences analyzed in this study that cluster within
genotype IX in comparison to 16 reference sequences obtained from
Genbank. The evolutionary history was inferred using the Minimum
Evolution method after initial utilization of the Neighbor-joining
algorithm. The percentage of replicate trees in which the associated
taxa clustered together in the bootstrap test (1000 replicates) are
shown next to the branches. The tree is drawn to scale, with branch
lengths in the same units as those of the evolutionary distances used
to infer the phylogenetic tree. The evolutionary distances were
computed using the p-distance method and are in the units of the
number of base differences per site. The ME tree was searched using
the Close-Neighbour-Interchange (CNI) algorithm at a search level of 1
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As the last reported outbreak in Kenya prior to
sampling was in 2007, and all animals sampled in this
study appeared to be asymptomatic based on visual
inspection by the research team, the high number of
PCR-positive pigs found in this study suggests that
virus may have been circulating within the porcine
population without clinical signs manifesting. This is
surprising as isolates of genotype IX are generally
thought to be highly virulent [33]. However, isolates
of this genotype have also been detected in apparently
asymptomatic pigs at slaughter in Uganda [44]. Iso-
lates of genotype X are generally found to be of lower
virulence in experimental infection and have been
identified in asymptomatic pigs in Kenya both at
slaughter [40] and in the community [21].
Although these East African genotypes are similar
overall in genome sequences, there are differences in the
multi-copy 360 and 550 family genes encoded at the
virus termini. Changes in the copy number and location
of these genes appears to be correlated with perceived
virulence of the virus isolates in pigs [45].
Antibody detection and virus isolation were not
undertaken in this study for several reasons. Antibody
detection is notoriously sporadic due to the immuno-
modulatory effect of the ASFV infection. Antibody
detection demonstrates both past and present infec-
tions [2] but differentiation of these situations is diffi-
cult [46]. It is also apparent that in the case of the
East African p72 Genotypes IX and X which are gen-
etically very close [45], the antibody response is often
difficult to detect, potentially due to the immunoge-
netics of the indigenous pig population [40, 43]. Like-
wise, antibody or low abundance of virus may hinder
virus isolation, as animals were apparently asymptom-
atic at the time of sampling. The process of virus iso-
lation is also difficult and lengthy as there is not a
suitable cell line for diagnostic virus isolation of
ASFV. ASFV must be propagated in primary porcine
macrophages for more than a month or adapted to
Vero cells. Neither of these approaches guarantees
obtaining a virus isolate. For these reasons, qPCR sur-
veillance represents a fast, sensitive, specific and reli-
able system for tracking ASFV epidemiology and is
currently considered the ‘gold standard’ for ASF gen-
ome detection [47].
The data obtained from qPCR does not indicate, how-
ever, whether or not the virus present is infectious.
While PCR could be used to identify possible routes of
virus shedding and transmission, the goal of this study
was to determine if ASFV was present within a popula-
tion of visually asymptomatic pigs in the field and to
then characterize the genotype of the virus.
Finding high viral loads within an apparently healthy
pig population, is unusual, though not unprecedented, in
the field of ASFV virology as ASF is typically associated
with 90 to 100 % mortality in pigs [1] [48]. For example,
a Ugandan study of over 1300 pigs, established primarily
to determine the persistence of viral DNA in asymptom-
atic animals found only three qPCR positive animals, all
of which were directly associated with ASF outbreak
events on their farm of origin [41]. High viral DNA loads
have, however, been identified in a small number of clin-
ically asymptomatic pigs in Tanzania [23, 48].
A potential explanation for our results is that, al-
though no official outbreak of ASF was reported in
Kenya at the time of sampling, we could have detected
diseased animals which were being slaughtered illegally.
Under-reporting of ASF has been documented in neigh-
bouring Uganda for reasons of distrust of government,
poor compensation for destroyed animals and stigma-
tisation of afflicted farmers [49–51]. Up-to 20 % of
farmers in northern Uganda reported “panic sales”, or
the quick removal of all animals (sick and healthy) at the
onset of an ASF outbreak. They further reported that
this activity was taking place clandestinely, often at night
[49]. A small study of pork butchers in Busia district
(Kenya) suggested that 19 % (3/16) reported buying a
pig “after being approached by farmers or after an Africa
Swine Fever (ASF) outbreak” [10].
The pigs sampled in this study did, appear on visual
examination (by a veterinarian or animal health assist-
ant) to be asymptomatic. It is possible therefore to hy-
pothesis that farmers may not have explicitly sold
animals due to clinical ASF, but use alternative cues to
decide whether to send animals for slaughter, such as
sudden in-appetence. This has been reported in the case
of other diseases such as leptospirosis and brucellosis
[52, 53]. There is also evidence that farmers may sell
their pigs in response to rumours of ASF in their vicinity
prior to the detection of sick or dying animals [54]. It
would have been very interesting, but unfortunately not
recorded in this study, to know which animals were sold
due to active approaches by farmers’ to traders or vice
versa. The latter scenario being the most common in
our study site [10, 55].
In Kenya, official inspection of pigs is required by
law at the slaughter facility. The ad-hoc arrangement
of the market, in conjunction with an understaffed
meat inspectorate in this situation, allows a large pro-
portion of pork to enter the food chain without in-
spection [25, 56, 57]. In our study area, only 5 %
(95 % CI 3–7) of pigs are subjected to ante-mortem
inspection, and the slaughter of ‘sick’ animals has
been reported in 5 % (95 % CI 3–7) of pig slaughter-
houses (Cook et al. In prep.). This poorly regulated
slaughter industry provides the opportunity for the
unscrupulous slaughter of potentially sick animals.
Hence slaughter based surveillance may over-
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represent disease prevalence and could explain the
findings of this study. Similarly, there has been high
prevalence of disease detected in market based
sampling compared to community-based sampling re-
ported in areas of Uganda endemic for trypanosomia-
sis in cattle [58]. These scenarios highlight the
potential for markets or slaughter facilities to act as
sensitive sentinels for disease and central point sam-
pling at such facilities to provide a cost-effective
method of disease detection.
Another explanation for the high rates of ASFV detec-
tion in this study is that infected pigs may have been
brought into the study site for slaughter from neighbouring
Uganda where outbreaks had been reported in April, July,
August and November of 2010 [59]. The border between
these two countries is distinctly porous, and pigs are
bought and sold across the international border [10, 54].
Studies of farmers, butchers and pig traders in this area,
suggest that the majority of pigs originate within 1–20 km
[10], with the vast majority travelling <5 km although this
pattern may be disrupted in cases of ‘panic selling’ [54].
This hypothesis might explain some of the PCR-positive
pigs identified in the study, the spatial distribution of the
positive samples, throughout the study site, does not sup-
port the theory of extensive cross-boundary incursion in
the current situation.
The system of procuring pigs for the slaughterhouses
and slaughter slabs in this study are very informal. For
the most part, a ‘scout’ is sent out from the slaughter-
house to the community of villages around it to con-
vince farmers with appropriately aged pigs to sell them
for that day’s slaughter. As such, all pigs slaughtered in a
given facility are drawn from the farms in the immediate
vicinity, and the population of pigs at slaughter differs
only from those in the community by age - pigs in the
community represent all age groups, those sold for
slaughter represent pigs aged approximately 9–12
months old. The pork meat from these facilities is sold
to local butcheries (usually owned by the same people as
the slaughterhouse) for small scale sale to the local com-
munity. All pigs in this study were reported to have orig-
inated from within Kenya (See Additional file 1), and as
the majority of pigs are brought to slaughter by bicycle
or foot [10], we believe that only pigs being slaughtered
in close proximity to the border might have originated
from Uganda. We are confident that the pigs in this
study represent pigs of slaughter age drawn from the
community surrounding the slaughterhouses.
Our results suggest, that there is ASFV circulating
within the pig population without clinical signs being
detected. Several mechanisms for the persistence of
virus in asymptomatic pig populations have been sug-
gested, such as chronic or sub-clinical infections or low
virulence isolates, but these do not provide sufficient
explanation for the situation described in this manu-
script. As mentioned previously, chronic infections are
not believed to occur on the African continent, Ct values
would have been expected in the range of 30–40 [18]
and symptoms such as emaciation and pathologic lesions
such as skin necrosis, arthritis, fibrinous pleuritis, peri-
carditis, pleural adhesions and necrotic pneumonia
should have been observed in the animals [2].
Genetic resistance to ASFV infections has been pro-
posed previously but the heritability has not been proven
[6]. Interestingly genomic analysis of 117 pigs included in
the current study revealed that animals testing negative
for ASFV on conventional PCR at ILRI (n = 65) had sig-
nificantly (P = <0.0001) higher indigenous ancestry, (54 %
and above) compared to those testing positive (n =52)
(Mujibi, Okoth, Onzere, Bishop, Fevre, Thomas, Plastow,
Rothschild, In prep).
The presence of infected pigs at abattoirs and in turn
the dispersal of potentially infective meat to butcheries
across the study site is of particular importance to the
control of ASF. Previous studies have identified the
movement of infected pigs to an abattoir and the move-
ment of infected pork products as being major risk fac-
tor for outbreaks, which appear to be distinct from the
sylvatic cycle [3, 60]. Unregulated slaughter increases the
risk of infected pork meat being sold, and infective ma-
terial being transported into un-exposed areas through
contact with fomites (including bicycles, vehicles,
slaughter staff clothing, and machete), or becoming pig
swill. These mechanisms could lead to transmission of
the virus [4, 61] and may have been instrumental for ini-
tiation of the outbreak which occurred soon after our
sampling period ended.
The discordance between the large number of ASFV
positive pigs in this study in comparison to a community
based study in the same area suggests that slaughter slab
data provides an overestimate of the overall prevalence of
ASFV in the local population. This is potentially promoted
by anthropogenic factors, such as panic selling of poten-
tially diseased pigs, and implies that slaughter slab data
alone cannot be used to estimate true prevalence with clear
implications for ASFV transmission dynamics modelling.
Conclusion
The detection of ASFV viral DNA in a relatively high
number of pigs delivered for slaughter during a period
with no reported outbreaks provides support for two hy-
potheses, which are not mutually exclusive: (1) that virus
prevalence may be over-estimated by slaughter-slab sam-
pling, relative to that prevailing in the wider pig popula-
tion; (2) that sub-clinical, chronically infected or
recovered pigs may be responsible for persistence of the
virus in endemic areas.
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Additional file 1: Results of conventional and real-time PCR. Contains
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Additional file 2: GenBank Accession Numbers. GenBank (http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/) Accession numbers for twenty ASFV
isolates for which genotypic analysis was performed. (XLSX 11 kb)
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